The Region: Why sanction Iran, you ask?
By BARRY RUBIN

More sanctions won’t stop the Islamic Republic’s quest for nuclear power, but there are other reasons for imposing them.

Since the Middle East is so important nowadays, it’s a pity that a lot of people – including policy-makers and opinion-makers – don’t understand some basic concepts about the region. So let’s try to explain these things to them.

What is the use, at least potentially, of sanctions on Iran? We all know that any sanctions the US government, or even the world, is likely to apply won’t stop Iran’s nuclear program. But there are many other potential goals for imposing sanctions. These include: making it harder for Iran to build these weapons and the missiles to carry them, slowing down the program, reducing Iran’s economic assets which can be used for military spending, denying Iran other weapons, intimidating Iran into greater caution in its actual behavior and encouraging factions (both within the establishment and in the opposition) to conclude that the current regime is leading them to disaster and must be displaced.

Of these six goals, the current sanctions plan largely accomplishes one of them – barring the sale of most conventional weapons (but not anti-aircraft missiles) – and does a small amount toward reducing Iran’s assets and slowing down the project. In general, though, it is a question of too little too late.

Again, the problem is not that the sanctions proposed (and which might still be watered down further) aren’t so huge as to make Iran stop but that they will not make Iran more cautious, promote internal conflict due to their high cost or really increase economic pressure to reduce military spending.

SHOULD THE world stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons? In principle, the answer is yes, but we now know that this will not happen. The task, then, is to prepare for a strong containment strategy, which is also not happening.

The US government seems to believe that “declaring” containment – saying for example, “if Teheran gives nuclear weapons to terrorists, we will do something,” “if it attacks a neighbor, we will do something” – is sufficient at a time when US credibility and deterrence is at an all-time low.

Why did Russia and China agree to the sanctions plan? Because it doesn’t stop them from doing everything they want, with the exception of selling conventional weapons to Iran (which they might smuggle into the country anyway).

How do we know that US credibility and deterrence power is at an all-time low due to the current policy of “proud weakness” by the Obama administration? Take a look at Lebanon, for example. Former champions of Lebanese sovereignty against Hizbullah, Iran and Syria, now rush to Damascus to pledge allegiance to the Syrian dictatorship. US leaders also don’t notice the defection of the Turkish regime to the other side. Even with Brazil, despite Obama’s lavish praise for that country’s radical president, Teheran’s view counted more than that of Washington.

There are many articles in Arabic-language newspapers and other sources about how they feel the US is too weak and undependable as a protector. Simultaneously, there are growing moves to appease Syria and Iran.

Is the concept of Iran using nuclear weapons as a “defensive umbrella” for aggression a viable one? Absolutely. Having nuclear weapons will make Iran “untouchable” in terms of retaliation. We already see this on a smaller scale with North Korea and Pakistan. North Korea is so confident that it torpedoed and sank a South Korean ship, knowing that its adversary can do nothing about it. That regime also ignores all the requests, demands and pressures on it to change its behavior even though its people are on the edge of starvation.

Pakistan is a stronger case. It has in the recent past seized Indian territory and continues to sponsor a full-scale terrorist war on India, knowing New Delhi has no military option. Since the bloody assault on Mumbai, Pakistan has done nothing and India is helpless to do anything.

This is all on a small scale compared to Iran’s capabilities, assets and ambitions. The strategic idea is that Iran will not actually fire nuclear weapons but having them gives it huge prestige that will help recruit thousands of Muslims in other countries into its client organizations, and intimidate the West and Arabic-speaking states into passivity or active appeasement.

SHOULD ISRAEL attack Iranian nuclear installations? I lean toward a no on this question for a number of reasons. We know that such an operation would not destroy Iran’s ability to rebuild its capability, or might not even damage it significantly. Too much can go wrong with the attack itself.

Moreover, Israel lacks the minimal international support for such an attack. I don’t mean Israel cannot do it, but on a cost-benefit basis – and in military operations one cannot assume everything will go right – the strategy doesn’t seem a good bet. All that is only true, of course, if Israeli assessments are that Iran is not going to attack Israel. And if those assessments ever change, then such an operation should be launched.

No one should underestimate the value of Israel’s own defensive system, which can be especially effective against the very small number of missiles Iran could launch even if it did decide to attack.

This analysis does not assume a nuclear Iran will not pose a huge and actual threat, but that the main problem is for Arabic-speaking states having to protect themselves from Iranian intimidation and subversion. It is also for the US having to create a credible system of containment. But the real burden for meeting this challenge is not for Israel.

The other countries of the world are going to have to learn for themselves the enormous mistake of failing to stop Iran and cheering the weakening of the United States. At that point, they are more likely to listen to reason. They are more likely to do this if they cannot depend on Israel to “save” them.

a jpost.com article

Analysis: Iran, West deceiving each other about nuke program

Iran under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty advances step by step toward military nuclear status, disguising its intentions all along the way.

In a January 31 television interview, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced out of the blue that Iran had agreed to the uranium exchange deal that it had rejected repeatedly since October 2009. This announcement came several days after it was reported that the US was deploying missile defense systems in the Gulf.

However, on Sunday, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would begin to enrich uranium by itself, to a level of 20 percent, and that it had attained laser technology for uranium enrichment.

The Iranian daily Kayhan, which is close to Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei, even declared that once Teheran enriches uranium to 20%, the West will not be able to stop it at that level of enrichment, and would have to negotiate with Iran over higher levels of enrichment.

These developments reveal deception by both parties – Iran and the West – vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. Iran under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty advanced step by step toward military nuclear status, disguising its intentions all along the way.

As for the West, it is presenting its policy as aimed at helping Iran, while its diplomatic measures, and especially the uraniumexchange deal, are really aimed at hampering Teheran’s nuclear progress. This deepens Iran’s distrust, for it understands the proposal’s real purpose.

Why won’t Iran hand over its uranium?

In the past months, Iran has adamantly rejected the proposal that the West presents as aimed at helping it by providing it with 20% enriched uranium for its research reactor in Teheran.

The reason for this refusal is that, according to the West’s intention, the uranium handed over would indeed be enriched to a higher level, but at the same time would be altered so that it could not be enriched further for military use – and this is a deal that Iran refused to accept.

In their public statements, Iran’s spokesmen do not bring up this point, but they have stated repeatedly that they do not trust the West. For example, Majlis speaker Ali Larijani warned at a February 6 conference in Teheran that the West was trying to deceive Iran with the nuclear deal but that the West should know that his country is not falling for it: “The truth is that you [Westerners] are conducting a sort of political deceit in order to separate Iran from [its] enriched uranium… But you need to know… that the Iranians are not naive.”

It should be further noted that Iran has no need for 1,200 kg. of 20%-enriched uranium, which is the quantity arbitrarily set by the West in the deal. The Teheran research reactor requires only 30 kg. of 20%-enriched uranium for its operations, and this quantity is equal to about 400 kg. of 5%-enriched uranium; furthermore, this quantity will last it until the reactor ceases to be operational, in about a decade.

Iran’s position is that if the West does indeed want only to help Iran, as it says, then Teheran does not need to enrich more than 400 kg., but the West is demanding that Iran hand over 1,200 kg., which constitutes 75% of its enriched uranium stock. This demand proves that the West wants to maintain its nuclear military hegemony and to prevent Iran from attaining military nuclear status. For this reason, Iran is adamant that it will not hand over its strategic reservesto the West.

The position presented in recent days by Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki focuses on the ongoing dispute between Iran and the superpowers vis-à-vis the quantity of lower-level enriched uranium that Teheran would hand over for enrichment.

At the 46th Munich Security Conference (February 5-7), Mottaki portrayed as likely Iran’s acceptance of a deal, and said that it and the IAEA had already agreed to the nuclear deal with a third country and that all that remained was to set the time, place, and quantity of uranium that Iran would hand over. However, he stressed that “it is the Iranian side that will set the scope [of the uranium]exchange [deal], with attention to its own needs” and that “the quantity of nuclear fuel [enriched to 3.5% that Iran will agree to transport from its territory] will be in accordance with Iran’s needs, and the moment that Iran announces what this quantity is, the deal will be able to go ahead.”

Nevertheless, an Iranian official told the Iranian news agency Fars that Teheran had not changed its position toward the deal proposed at the Vienna conference, on October 19-21, 2009, despite reports in recent days about a “softer” stance being adopted vis-à-vis the proposal.

In addition, Ahmadinejad announced in an interview on Iranian television that Teheran does not oppose an uranium exchange deal outside Iranian soil, adding that circles in Iran had raised an unnecessary stink over the issue; however, he ignored the issue on which Iran and the West disagree – that is, the quantity of enriched uranium that Teheran is willing to hand over.

Ahmadinejad: I ordered 20% enrichment

At the same time, in a step typical of Iran’s nuclear policy, Ahmadinejad launched a new phase in Teheran’s struggle against the superpowers with his defiant February 7 declaration that he had already ordered the start of 20% uranium enrichment – thus obviating the need for dialogue with the West or for compliance with the nuclear deal.

At the same venue, a conference titled “Iran’s Laser Technology Achievements,” Ahmadinejad said: “I ordered the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization [Ali Akbar Salehi] to begin enriching uranium to 20%, but the path of dialogue remains open.”

He added: “Iran has attained the ability to enrich uranium using laser technology, and with this method it is possible to perform enrichment faster and more accurately, and to any [enrichment] level – but actually we do not plan to use this method.”

He continued, “Of course, if these countries [i.e. the 5+1] come to us without preconditions, the way to an exchange deal is still open.”

The next day, Salehi said that on February 9, Iran would begin to enrich uranium at 20% at the Natanz facility, and that despite its ability to enrich uranium to any level it desires, Iran preferred the option of acquiring the nuclear fuel plates from a foreign country. In addition, he declared that Iran would construct, within the year (i.e., by March 2011), 10 uranium enrichment centers.

The conservative daily Kayhan, which is close to Khamenei, even stated in a February 9 editorial that the West had missed the opportunity to stop Iran at 5% enrichment, and that the minute Iran enriches uranium to 20%, the West will not be able to stop it from advancing further. At that point, Iran will not agree to stop at 20%, and the negotiations will be over enrichment to a higher level.

It should be noted that Iran possesses 1,600 kg of 5%-enriched uranium (5% is the level permitted under IAEA regulations for generating power; the country must announce that it will be enriching it and must obtain advance approval). However, it is continuing its intensive work to enrich more uranium, even though it has no plant or nuclear reactor that requires such quantities of enriched uranium for operation. Furthermore, the Bushehr reactor, which has not yet begun operating, does not require locally enriched uranium, because under the agreement that Iran signed with Moscow in 2005, Moscow is providing the fuel rods to operate it, and Iran has been receiving them since 2007.

In these circumstances, it is very peculiar that Salehi announced that Iran will construct 10 additional uranium enrichment centers; it means that Iran can be suspected of enriching uranium for military purposes.

The West’s weakness

Again and again, the West has called on Iran to accept its ultimatums, which Iran knows are toothless; this approach exposes the West’s, and particularly the US’s and Europe’s, inability to deal with Iran on vital issues of global security and stability.

The West’s unwillingness to publicly acknowledge that the “deal” that it proposed is not really aimed at helping Iran, as it claims, but rather at preventing Iran from using the enriched uranium for military purposes, strips the West of its credibility vis-à-vis Teheran.

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Iran, West deceiving each other about nuke program